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PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MAL-
PRACTICE - COMPLAINTS, FILED BY PARENTS OF ABNORMAL INFANTS
ALLEGING "WRONGFUL LIFE" BASED UPON PHYSICIANS'
NEGLIGENCE WHICH RESULTED IN PARENTS' DECISION NOT TO
TERMINATE PREGNANCY, STATED LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CAUSES OF
ACTION, HOWEVER SIMILAR COMPLAINTS, FILED ON BEHALF OF
ABNORNAL INFANTS, DID NOT.
Upon learning of her pregnancy, Mrs. Becker and her
husband contacted the defendant physicians.' The Becker's infant
was subsequently born severely retarded, suffering from Down's
Syndrome.2 The plaintiffs brought suit on their own behalf, and
that of their infant, alleging the defendants negligently failed to
inform Mrs. Becker of the increased risk of Down's Syndrome in
children born to women over thirty-five years of age and of the
availability of an amniocentesis test.3 Had the test been performed'
and the true condition of the fetus revealed, the plaintiffs would
have terminated the pregnancy. 4 They sought damages for medical
expenses for the long-term institutional care of the infant, physical
and emotional inJury and loss of services and consortium. 5 The
I. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401. __, 386 N.E.2d 807. 808. 413 N.Y.S.2d 895. 896
(1978). Defendants were specialists in obstetrics and gynecology. The plaintiff remained lnder their
exchisiv'c care thro~ighoit the pregnancy and the birth of her child. Id.
2. Id. Down's Syndrome, commonly known as mongolism, is a form of retardation
accompanied by distortions in physical feat,'res. SCHMIIT's ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
M-107 (1978).
3. 46 N.Y.2d at __. 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Amniocentesis involves the
perfomating or tapping with a needle of the inner laver of tisse which forms the bag containing the
ft'tis in the pregnant uters. This procedtre is ,,sed to remove and sttdy part of the amniotic fltid.
The test will determine whether a massive genetic disorder sich as Down's Syndrome is present in
the fets. SCHMIoIT's ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE A-137 (1978).
4.46 N.Y.2d at_, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
5. Id. at __. 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The original action, broght in the
Stupreme Coutrt. Trial Term. Nassau Conty, New York, resulted in the granting of the defendants'
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New York Court of Appeals held that a complaint filed on behalf of
an abnormal infant alleging negligence against a physician for
failture to inform parents of the risks involved in pregnancy,
resulting in a decision not to terminate a pregnancy, did not state a
legally cognizable cause of action, 6 but that a complaint, filed by
parents of an abnormal infant alleging such negligence, did state a
legally cognizable cause of action for pecuniary damages suffered as
a consequence of birth.7 Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.
E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).8
Courts have consistently rejected "wrongful life" 9 actions filed
on behalf of infants who allege that, but for the negligence of a
physician, they would not have been born to siffer an impaired
life.t 0 In Gleilman z. Cosgrove,1 the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of an action brouight on behalf of an infant
who had been born severely retarded as a result of the mother's
contraction of rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy. 12 The
defendant advised the mother that the rubella would have no effect
on the fetutS.1 3 Plaintiff brought stit on the theory that had the
defendant doctor advised his parents of the possibility of
miition to ,iisniiss the eomplainI. Thc Spvruinic Cotor. Al ) eIlat Division. toadified tilerer vwhich
gr -d tII di'nissa Iby roI i tng thill It" I ) ilp.it insofar as it aileged negligence on the parl of' ie+
lf~i i n t ling to give the illaintiflts sol1]wcnt infol'nlation tol decide whethecr (,r- not t(, contin,-e
the Iret.itaicy, (ill state a (.;,Ise of'action in tialprat v ti l li e pli  nary loss. The tli alfir tnd the
dimiissal oI lle itaiititnfs' cose (d" action seeking dtamiages for emotional distress. Becker v.
Schwartz, 60 App. Div. 587,-, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119. 119-20 (1977).
6. -16 N. '.2d at __ , 186 N.E.2d at 111. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 199-900. A legally cognizable action
is one wi thi thille lrislictio t of li' o lin o hlle power given to tIlte cilori by ]ass' to adi dicaie tlii"
controversey." Saniei Goldwyn Inc. v,. United Artists Corp., 113 F.2d 713, 7(17 (4th Cir. 1940).
7. 46 N.Y.2d at __ , 386 N.E.2d at 813. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901- 'I'he couirt specifically rijected
tli allanee of darnages for psychic i-or emotional harnl ti+ (he par'ltS occisioined by till' birth of
theirc hiM. d.ia __ .386 N.E .2d at 811. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
8. Park '. Chessin, 46 N.Y.2d 401. 386 N. ,.2d 807. 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). is a compianion
case to Bciker involing the birth of' all infnt with ptlvciystic kidney discase to parents who had
previo, sly had a sinilarlv aflicted child. Prior to tilt birth of, the se'cold diseased chili, he ilthad
conlslltth'd with the( delclinmt olbstetricians who intcorrectly inlbrined thet plaintifts that tilt"- disease
wos not hereditary. Plaintiffs all'ged that, bilt for tille d'indtlants ' negligence. they would o t li e
cotneived a second child. The result in Park was iitnitcal i tihal in Beaket. Id.
9. Many alleged wrngs have been grolped itder a cise of'action tertied "'rongitd lif' antid
soleli cunftsion exists as to what actions silo,dd be inct'dd ,uoder that term. Tri "wttgli life""
actions are ([lotse inl which ilt', action is base(] ,!pon (h ilt"bith of an intended, lint albnorn al child.
which (he plaintiffcontends woodd [lot have been born at all had tile parents Ibeen llrolerly advised o,1"
the ablno'nialitv. In this type of'action it is not alleged that the defendlant's treall/elt ('ao~sc] ilhe
abnormalities. 46 N.Y.2d at _ . 386 N.F,.2d at 811. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 89).
Attiotns for "wrongll life" sho,ild he distingished primarily Iioni actions .1tl Ir "wronig, '
conception." where an inplatnned 1)it healthh child is born after aI negligently pl-fiirtned and
tinsitu'essfi d sterilization proc trle. Id.
For an alternative classilication schenit for these actions. sie Kashi. The Case i/ the- IUnwaard
Blessing: 14rong'fulL fe, 31 U. MIAMI L. Rpsv. 1409, 1409-10(1977).
10. Berman v. Allen, 81) N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979): Gleitrnan v. Cuisgrtov'. 41) N.J. 22, 227
A.2d 689 (1967)1 Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp.. 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); jacobs v. Theimer. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975): l)iner v. St. Michael's
Hosp.. 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372(1975).
11.49 NJ. 22. 227 A.2d689 (1967).
12. Gleitnlan v. Cosgrove. 49 Nj. 22. _ .227 A.2d 689. 692 (1967).
13. Id. at _ 227 A.2d at 690.
272
RECENT CASE
abnormalities, the pregnancy would have been terminated. 14 Plain-
tiff alleged that since he would not have been born, his very life
was wrongftl.' 5 The court affirmed the dismissal ru1ling that "the
condtct complained of, even if trie, does not give rise to damages
cognizable at law.'" 6 Other coturts'' have also rejected ''wrongful
life" claims brought by infants on this basis.
Smith v. Uniled States, 18 reiected a claim similar to that in
Gleitman on a different theory. This action was brought on behalf of
an infant born with serious defects as a result of the mother's
contraction of rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy.19
Plaintiff alleged that the physician had negligently failed to
diagnose the rubella and thereby deprived the parents of the
opportunity to terminate the pregnancy. 0 The court found that
because there, was no effective treatment to reduce the risk of
abnormalities in an infant after an incidence of rubella in the
mother, the diagnosis, whether incorrect or not, was not the
proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injuries.21
Actions for "wrongful life" brought by parents on their own
behalf were rejected by the courts until recently. 22 A growing
majority of courts that have considered the question have
recognized an action by parents for "wrongful life" as legally
cognizable.2 3 This has been particularly true since Roe v. Wade,
24
which removed state barriers from most abortions. The critical
issue for these courts has been the nature of allowable damages.
Texas was the first to recognize, as legally cognizable, an action by
14. Id. t . 227 A. 2d at 691.
15. Id. at 227 A.2d at 692.
6. Id. The' 6rIlinan co~irt stated ias follows:
lhc inlant w,.ld have , s lcas,ere the difit'rcnce tetween his life with dificts aga i ns
Ihc' ,mer void of non-c.Xistcu, hti~ it is impossible to make soch a dectriination. This
(')!l( nor) 'cigh Ilhi \farlm, of'" it liftc with1 imlpairments against the non-CxistnCIe( (if'
il-i itself I Issertiltg t ha e li t i sh 111d i ,t ha .been born. thc infant plainti fl' ake.s it
Ilgic'ally irnplossilc ' r a co(m to niva,.c his alleged damnages beca,,sc of (he
it Iposs if)il it ,Y,fIm aki ng the coinpa rison rc(, I 'irntd 1)y compecnsa I ry rvied it's.
'l.
17. Gildiner v. Thomas jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Sipp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
18. 392 F. Slpp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
19. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Stipp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
20. Id.
21. Id
22. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island College
Hosp.. 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
23. Gildiner v. Thomasjefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Sopp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v.
Allen, 81 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979): Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dllmer v.
S(. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
strI'k down two sntaties which restricted a pregnant wottan's right to an abortion. The Coort held
thi it state todld tiot constitltionally limit a pregnant woman's right to an abortiot d ring the first
tri i.stir of pregnancv. 410 U.S. at 163: 410 U.S. at 194, 198, 199.
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parents against a physician for "wrongful life" in Jacobs v.
Theimer.15 The case involved an action by parents against a
physician for negligently failing to diagnose rubella in the mother
during the first trimester of pregnancy.16 Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant's negligence deprived them of the option to terminate
the pregnancy.17 The court recognized the cause of action as a
cognizable one in the area of medical malpractice and stated that
defendant was tinder a duty to disclose the risk of a defective
infant. 28 As a matter of policy the court found that such reasonable
disclosures, regarding the nature and hazards of any disease, would
have been made by a medical practitioner exercising due care. 29
Allowable damages, if proven, would be limited to the financial
expenses reasonably necessary for the care and treatment of the
child's abnormality. 30 The Jacobs court disallowed damages for
additional child rearing expenses as based on speculation of the
emotional benefit of parenthood to parents of a defective infant. 31
In a similar case, Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital,32 the United States District Court recognized a cause of
action for "wrongful life" brought by parents of a genetically
defective child. 33 The action arose from the negligent performance
of an amniocentesis test to determine whether a fetus was afflicted
with Tay-Sachs disease. 34 Plaintiffs were incorrectly advised that
the fetus was not afflicted with the disease, allegedly resulting in the
decision not to terminate the pregnancy. 35 The court held that the
physician's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries as a result of the denial of the opportunity to abort, and
allowed damages for the child's medical expenses. Defendant's
contention that recognition of a cause of action for "wrongful life"
was contrary to public policy was rejected. 37 The court found that
society had a vital interest in insuring that genetic testing was
accurately performed. 38  Failure to properly perform an
25. 519S.W.2d846(Tex. 1975).




30. Id. at 850.
31. Id. at 849.
32. 451 F. Stipp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
33. Gildiner v. Thomas.Jefferson Univ. Hosp.. 451 F. Stpp. 692. 695-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
34. Id. at 694. Tav-Sachs disease, also known .is attatirotic ftmilial idiocm . is a hereditan.
genetic disease ffe'ting" children and is characte'ized I)% partial or ionmple loss of vision. mental
i deridehelopmilet, . sofI'ness of i itsltes antid convtls ions. Sciiminr's 5 ATTORNE't'S DICTIONAR) OF
N - t cir, . A-126 (1978).
:15. 451 F. Stipp. at 694.
:36. Id. at 694-95.
37. Id. at 696.
38. Id.
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amniocentesis test could result in the abortion of a healthy fetus, as
well as the unwanted birth of an afflicted infant.3 9 Judicial
recognition of a cause of action for negligence in the performance of
genetic testing was founded in part tupon the policy of encouraging
the accurate performance of such testing by penalizing physicians
who failed to exercise due care.40 Unlike Jacobs,4 1 the court in
Gildiner did not indicate that damages would be limited to medical
expenses and reserved that issue for trial.
42
The NewJersey Supreme Court, 43 in a case factually identical
to Becker, has also recognized a cause of action by parents of
abnormal children alleging "wrongful life" as cognizable at law.
4
4
In this action the coturt held that damages for emotional injury, if
proven, were allowable, but specifically disallowed damages for
medical and other expenses that wotld be inctrred in raising and
educating the child. 45 In denying recovery for expenses to be
incurred in raising the child, the court fotnd that stch an award
would constitute a windfall to the parents and wou~ld be
disproportionate to the culpability of the defendant.4 6 The coirt
allowed compensation for emotional harm on the theory that it
more accurately represented the proper damages for the
deprivation of the parents' option to accept or reject a parental
relationship with a potentially defective child.
47
Prior to the Becker decision, the New York Court of Appeals
had consistently held that complaints, filed by parents of abnormal
children either on their own behalf' or that of their infant alleging
"wrongful life," were not cognizable at law.48 Becker followed the
majority rule by rejecting, as not legally cognizable, actions by
infants alleging that their very life was wrongful and seeking
damages on that basis. 4 9 The coLrt rejected the infant plaintiff's
action on the grounds that he had suffered no legally cognizable
injury.5 0 In finding no cognizable injury the coturt refused to
recognize "the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole,
39. Id.
40. Id.
41 .Jacbs v. Theirnr, 519 S.W. 2d ai 850.
42. 451 F. Sopp. at 696.
43. Bermnan v. AIcn, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).




48. St('w;ttrt o long I IsIlI ( lh'gc FIoI.. 3 0 N.Y. 2d (I 5. 2 83 N.E.2d f1 I. 332 N.Y.S. 2d 640
(1972). This mcmorandm opinion rcicc'td the casc of 't ion on Ihc satO( grom nds as thc New
Jersey cort in Gloitman. Id. at- , 283 N. F. 2 d at 616, 332 NYS .2d at 640-41.
49. Bckt'r v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at__ , 386 N.E.2d 8 11l. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
50. Id. at __ , 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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functional human being." '5 1 Whether it was better not to be born
than to be born with serious defects was an issue the court asserted
no competence to resolve.5 2 In addition, the court felt that such an
action demanded a calculation of damages based upon a
comparison of life in an impaired state and non-existence, a
comparison the law was not equipped to make. 53
In accepting as cognizable a cause of action by parents alleging
'wrongful life," the Becker court accepted the majority position and
in doing so overruled what had been the rule in New York.5 4 The
court found the plaintiffs had properly alleged the existence of a
duty between themselves and the defendant physicians.55 Further,
the breach of this duty caused ascertainable damages which
included the pecuniary expenses resulting from the care and
treatment of the infant.5 6 The Becker court specifically rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that damages for emotional or psychic injury,
allegedly due to the birth of an impaired infant, were within the
scope of allowable compensation.57 The court refused to sanction
the recovery of these damages because of their speculative nature.
5 8
In the opinion of the court, it would not be possible to assess the
emotional injury because of an inability to make the complex
comparison between the damages caused by defendants' negligence
and the benefit of parenthood conferred on the plaintiffs.5 9
In Becker, the New York Court of Appeals was forced to make a
ruling in an area of great controversy. While the fundamental
reason for rejecting the infant's cause of action 60 may be legally
5 . Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. But see Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). The
Court in Paterson stated as follows:
Where the tort is of such a nature as to precht'de the ascertaininit of the amo int of'
damages with certainty, it wooId he a perversion of f, ' damental principles of' .orsticc
to denv all reliefto the in;, red person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer Iom making
any a nends for his acts.
Id. at 563.
54. Se Stewart s. long Island College Hosp.. 30 N.Y.2d 695. _ . 2R3 N.'.2d 616. 312
N. Y.S.2d 640. 641 (19 72).
55.46 N. Y.2d at __ 386 N.E.2 1at 813 413 N. Y.S.2d at 901.
56. Id. In Becker, the coort refised to further delineate the nature or limits of damages that
might he allowable, as the action was limited to addressing the legal stifficienc of' the complaints
themselves. Id.
57. Id. Accord, Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64. 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
58. 46 N.Y.2d at -,386 N.E.2d at 813-14,413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02.
59. Id. The dissent in Becker contended that the parents' soit for "wrongf, life'" shold also be
dismissed on grounds that the defendants' negligence was not the proximate cause of the inluries,
that the parents' cause of action was derivative of the infant's ca,use ofaction and that the infant had
s,uffered no legally cognizable inury. 46 N.Y.2d at _ . 386 N.E.2d at 816-18. 413 N.Y.S.2d at
904-06 (\Vachtler & Gabrielli.. J., dissenting in part).
60. The court reiected the infant's case of'action primarily in gronds that the infant did not
stifter any legally cognizable intry. 46 N.Y.2d at __, 386 N.E.2d at 812. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 9(0.
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sound, the alternative ground, that damages are uinascertainable,
seems less than convincing in light of fundamental ju~stice and
existing precedent. 61 Additionally, the court notes its inability to
properly address the required comparisons and provide some
compensation to the infant. 62 A solution to this hurdle might be
found in the "Special Benefit" rule, 63 which has been used to
calculate damages in an analogous situation in "wrongful
conception" actions. Applying this ride, the defendant would be
required to compensate the infant for the impairments the child
must stiffer as a result of the defendant's negligence which
prevented the termination of the pregnancy. The defendant would
be able to offset the portion of those damages equal to the value of
the benefit he conferred on the plaintiff through his negligence, that
of influencing the parents to give life to the fettls.
6 4
The chief importance of Becker, however, is the recognition of a
cause of action by parents of abnormal infants alleging "wrongful
life.'' 65 Through this decision, the court brought a large and
influential jurisdiction in line with the maiority position. 66 In a
more fundamental sense, it has provided a legal recourse to parents
of abnormal infants.
Since no case alleging "wrongful life" has been decided in
North Dakota, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of this decision on
North Dakota law. Should an action for "wrongful life" be
brought by an infant, the court would be obliged to follow the
uniform rule 67 and reject their complaints or accept them on the
basis of an innovative approach, such as the adoption of the "Spe-
cial Benefit" rule. 68  Implicit in any new approach allowing
61. 282 U.S. 555 (1931). See supra note 53 tor the concept offindamental .Istice as applied to
allegedly ,nastertainable damages.
62.46 N.Y.2d at -386 N.E.2d at 812,413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
63. The "Special Benefit" rule states as follows:
When the defendant's tortioos conch!ct has caosed harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in doing so has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the vale of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, to the extent that this is eqttable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
For applications of section 920, involving the calculation of damages for the economic costs of
raising a child in wrongful conception cases. see generally, Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp.
126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976): Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, __ Minn. __, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
64. In the present tase, the plaintiff svoild be compensated for past and ftlut re pain and
s-tfiring and those petmiary expenses that would continme beyond maturity. This ammnt v'oidd.
how.ever be rechced by an amotnt equtivalcnt to the sale of the benefit conferred on the infant
throtgh tire defendants' negligence. that of an impaired life. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNi) OF 1 ORTS , 920
(1977).
65. Beker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at .386 N.E.2d at 813. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
66. See cases cited supra note 23 for. risdictions in the majorit.
67. See spra note 10 for cases which follow the iniform r,''.
68. RESTATEMENT (SKceoo) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
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recognition must be standards to determine the degree and nature
of defects that would sustain a cognizable injury. Also difficult to
assess would be the result of an action brought by parents of a child
born with defects. Recognition of the action would bring North
Dakota in line with a growing majority of jurisdictions which have
considered the issue. 6 9 Further, recognition would encourage the
accurate performance and interpretation of genetic testing by
allowing actions against physicians who fail to follow acceptable
medical standards.7 0 Should a cause of action by parents for
"wrongfid life" be recognized, the question of allowable damages
would require the court to choose between competing policy
considerations. Recovery for all pectniary expenses reasonably
necessary for raising and educating the child may be viewed as
disproportionate to the physician's culpability and constitute a
windfall to the parents.7 Conversely, denial of all recovery for
pecu:niary expenses could tend to discourage physicians from
exercising the itmost care in genetic, testing.72 A compromise
solution might be to allow for recovery based on the additional
expenses to be incu:rred in raising an afflicted child as contrasted
with the cost of' raising a normal, healthy infant. The question of
allowing damages for emotional harm is perhaps the most difficult
to assess and has produced the most pronounced recent split of
authority in other jurisdictions.73 However, should the court find
that there was a duity owed directly from the physician to.the
parents, it would seem inconsistent to deny recovery for emotional
harm as a component of damages unless it is determined that such
damages are too speculative in nature.
7 4
DANIEL P. LITTERAL
69 ,'Sr cases oie .,I pr noic 23 Itriisdlic(Ions inthe growing flajority.
7(0. Giliner v. Thomi as.iJeerson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. S ipp. at 696.
71. Berman v. Allen. 8(1 N.J. at __, 404 A.2d at 14.
72. 451 F. Stipp. at 696.
73. Becker v. Schwartz. 46 N.Y.2d at _ 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02
(d isa I low ing (da niages for psychic or etiot 1onalI ha rin); Berma v. Allen, 80 N.J. at - . 404 A.2d at
14 (allowing damnages only for emotional harm).
74. 46 N.Y.2d ;I - 386 N.E.2d at 818. 41'3 N.Y.S.2d at 906 (Wachtler & Gabrielli....
dissenting in part). The dissent tn I, Brkt'r contends tiat once it is determined that the physician did
breach a dotty directly owed to the parents, there is no longer any basis for denying recovery fotr
emotional in.iury as well as pect Iiary loss. The dissent implies that the majority has confhsed the
issm of whether a separate dolt was owed by the physician to refrain front tinintended emotional
harm with the iss Ie of whether that1 harm is a proven component tf the damages onc t e texistence of
a c,ty has been established. Acc rding o titis view. the proper tjuestion is whether the plaintiffs
stli'red compensable emotional harm irom th breach of any d Ity which was directly ovwed to them
by the defendant. Id.
278
